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Recent experience suggests that h umanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are a growth industry for military forces. In the last 12 months 
alone, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has provided emergency aid to victims 
of the Pakistan earthquake; the Indian Ocean tsunami; the Nias, Indonesia earth-
quake (in which nine AOF personnel died in a helicopter crash); and Cyclone 
Larry, a category 5 tropical cyclone that tore across the north Q ueensland coastline 
of Australia in early 2006. 
Figures from the World Health Organization's Centre for Research on Epide-
miology of Disasters show that from 1990 to 2003 there was a 180% increase in the 
number of people affected by natural disasters: 255 million people in 2003 up from 
90 million in 1990.1 Between 1990 and 2000 in Asia alone there were 215 so-called 
"non-complex" relief operations (floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc., 
where host nations were the primary responders).2 Operation Shaddock, fo r 
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example, saw the ADF come to the aid of Papua New Guinea following a tsunami 
on July 17, 1998 that killed over 3,000 people. 
Complex relief operations, on the other hand, involve the delivery of human i-
tarian assistance to societies riven by warring factions, civil disorder or population 
displacement, any or all of which problems might be compounded by the misery of 
a natural disaster. One example is the multinational force led by the ADF to render 
humanitarian aid, provide security and instill the rule of law in guiding Timor-
Leste to become the first new nation of the twenty-first century. 
However one might categorize emergency relief operations, it is traditionally 
the case that military forces are called upon to provide the humanitarian or disaster 
aid required often with little, or indeed no, notice. Military forces have the re-
sources at hand to quickly reach inaccessible places. But increasingly, some non-
government organizations (NGOs) rival the capacity of military forces to transport 
large volumes of supplies in relief operations. The Brookings Institution cites a case 
in point: "During the highly visible airlift of food into Afghanistan during the win-
ter of 200 1--02, the U.S. military delivered only a tiny fraction of the total brought 
in through conventional operations by WFP [World Food Program] and NGOs 
like IRe [International Red Cross] ."} Not only do such NGOs have the capacity to 
deliver aid where required-they can do it cheaper than military forces. 
Perhaps relief operations should be left to specialist NGOs. This is the prefer-
ence of some NGOs, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, who seek to provide aid re-
lief unencumbered by politics and military association. This would permit military 
forces to maintain their focus on their core function of warfighting. Military forces 
usually are only too pleased to hand over the reins of relief operations as soon as 
practicable to NGOs or UN agencies. For some time the United States has been un-
easy about the resources of its armed forces being diverted from its core function, 
as noted by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS): 
For over a decade, some Members of Congress have expressed reservations about U.S. 
military involvement in peacekeeping. The Bush Administration's decision to reduce 
the commitment of U.S. troops to international peacekeeping seems to reflect a major 
concern: that peacekeeping duties [defined by the CRS to include "providing security 
for hwnanitarian relief efforts"] are detrimental to military "readiness," i.e., the ability 
of U.S. troops to defend the nation.4 
Certainly there is no shortage ofNGOs around the world ready and willing to assist 
in relief operations. It is estimated that within three weeks of the 2004 Boxing Day 
tsunami in Southeast Asia there were over 109 NGOs operating in Indonesia, 84 in 
Sri Lanka and 35 in Thailand .s 
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The fact remains, of course, that military forces are indispensable for relief oper-
ations in hostile or uncertain security environments. Moreover, despite the capac-
ityofNGOs for economical long-term lease of aircraft in relief operations, military 
forces are unmatched in their ability to rapidly deliver aid to remote places, partic-
ularly in the maritime environment. The day after the 2004 tsunami, Australian 
soldiers departed for Sumatra and within a week had established a water purifica-
tion plant in Banda Aceh. Military forces have the capacity to bring instantaneous 
infrastructure to a devastated area. As simply stated in Royal Australian Navy doc-
trine: "Naval forces are self-supporting and do not create logistic burdens in situa-
tions where infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged. " 6 
The NATO Review neatly assessed the military contribution to relief operations 
in these terms: 
The recent disasters in the United States and Pakistan have highlighted how useful 
certain military capabilities can be when first responders find themselves 
overwhelmed. Strategic airlift is crucial to transport urgently needed relief supplies as 
commercial aircraft are not always available in sufficient numbers. Moreover, 
helicopters have proven essential in the first phase of a disaster-relief operation when 
roads are often too badly damaged to be passable and sealift capabilities are critical to 
sustaining the relief effort in a more cost-effective way in the weeks and months 
following a disaster. Rapidly deployable military hospitals and medical personnel can 
also help out overburdened first responders. In addition, military engineers. water 
purification units and search-and-rescue teams all have the skills that can greatly 
improve crisis-response capabilities and save lives.' 
Whether wrought by climate change or happenstance, the world has recently 
witnessed a succession of natural disasters of such scale as to pose transnational 
challenges that require international cooperation and understanding. This need 
was dearly evident in the most devastating of these disasters, the Indian Ocean tsu-
nami of Boxing Day 2004.8 The tsunami was triggered by an enormous undersea 
earthquake (9.3 on the Richter scale) that ruptured the earth's crust for over 1,000 
kilometers, releasing tremendous energy. This, the second most powerful earth-
quake ever recorded,9 generated a tsunami whose destruction in the immediate re-
gion was shocking, and a global tragedy. 
What frameworks exist fo r civilian-military and international cooperation in re-
lief operations? On December 19, 1991, UN General Assembly Resolution 46/18210 
created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, designed to strengthen the coordi-
nation of humanitarian emergency assistance. The resolution outlined 30 guiding 
principles "in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartial-
ity"11 for the provision of relief aid. It reaffirmed the primary responsibility of States 
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to care for the victims of natural disasters within their borders but asserted that 
"the United Nations has a central and unique role to play in providing leadership 
and coordinating the efforts of the international community to support the af-
fected countries."12 The resolution makes it dear that coordination is the key tool 
in humanitarian operations. 
The UN Charter makes no specific reference to the use of military fo rces in hu-
manitarian operations. There is an inherent tension between the roles of civilian 
agencies and military forces in relief operations. This was evident, for example, in 
1994 during Operation Restore Hope in which US military and international civil-
ian aid agencies worked through a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) to 
overcome their "cultural differences" for the common good of Rwandan refugees 
in Zaire. 13 
In a perfect world there should naturally be complementari ty between military 
forces and NGOs in relief operations. The Geneva Conventions and their Addi-
tional Protocolsl4 refer to impartial relief societies concerned with the provision of 
humanitarian aid and the protection of relief agency personnel. Surely this pro-
vides common ground with military forces whose duty it is to protect civilians un-
der the law of armed conflict. 
In 1994 the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in 
Disaster Relief1' were adopted by various nations to provide effective interaction of 
military and civilian actors in disaster relief operations. In subsequent years, the 
Oslo Guidelines were developed by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Hu-
manitarian Affairs (OCHA}.Aftera review of a number of operations, OCHAcon-
ceded that in a range of international relief operations: 
[TJhe coordination between the international military forces and the responding UN 
humanitarian agencies and other international civilian actors has been critically 
examined by a nwnber of participants and observers and found to be in need of 
improvement. The success that was achieved in the use of military resources and 
coordination was due largely to the extraordinary efforts of the personnel in the field .16 
Also in 1994, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement pub-
lished its Code of Conduct for disaster relief operations. I? This code stipulates ten 
principles fo unded upon the need for impartiality-that aid should be given on the 
basis of and in proportion to need alone. 
The conduct of civil-military relief operations requires impartiality and cooper-
ation but also cultural sensitivity and political sagacity. This was evident no more 
so than in the international relief operation in the wake of the 2004 Boxing Day 
tsunami. 
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About 250 kilometers from the epicenter of the earthquake, Aceh suffered the 
full brunt of the tsunami's force. This was a catastrophe in one of the most iso-
lated and politically charged areas of Southeast Asia and a source of political in-
stability for more than a century. IS Before the arrival of international aid workers, 
the Indonesian government had quarantined Aceh. Indonesian forces regularly 
dashed with the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM, rebels. The local population is as 
devoutly Muslim as anywhere in the world and Sharia law is in force. For nearly 
three decades, Aceh was embattled, silent and dosed off from the outside world. 
The earthquake and tsunami left survivors devastated and prey to the entreaties 
of al-Qaida and Jamah Islamia, whose members, undoubtedly, were gathering to 
hand. 
The first foreigners on the scene and with the greatest lift capacity were forces 
from Australia, Singapore and the United States. Troops were unarmed and relied 
upon Indonesian security to conduct relief operations. As an Indonesian com-
mander remarked, "If you want to carry a weapon, you'd better choose a side." 
During the three months that the ADF conducted relief operations in Aceh, some 
200 people were killed in skinnishes between GAM and Indonesian forces. 
It was into this situation that thousands of troops and hundreds of civilian re-
lief workers descended. While foreign forces and NGOs scurried to organize 
themselves, stoic Indonesian soldiers set about the grimmest of tasks, tirelessly 
clearing waste and debris and disposing of the dead in accordance with local prac-
tice. Many of these soldiers had themselves lost loved ones. Many had no family or 
homes to which to return. When the tsunami struck, Indonesian troops were con-
ducting an amphibious landing exercise. All those soldiers perished, along with 
some 1,000 of their comrades at their headquarters at Banda Aceh. Offshore the 
USS Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group and USS Abraham Lincoln 
provided considerable muscle and heavy lift. US Navy aviation assets were crucial 
to the aid effort. 
The ADF's primary concern was to ensure that the relief effort was in accor-
dance with Indonesian priorities. The view that Indonesians knew best what Indo-
nesians required was a fundamental precept of Australian, Singaporean and 
American forces . Through the Civil-Military Aid Coordination Conference 
(CMAC) this view was shared by other foreign forces and the majority ofNGOs. 
The CMAC met daily in Medan, the transport hub of northern Swnatra. An Indo-
nesian colonel, with an Australian lieutenant colonel as deputy, chaired the meet-
ings. The CMAC was the principal means of sharing information about the 
progress of the mission, road conditions, security concerns, aid priorities, bottle-
necks and expectations. 
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Expectation management was a prime concern for the CMAC. The thousands 
of military and civilian aid workers who descended upon Indonesia burned with 
the desire to help. The mood was reflected by Dr. Fiona Terry, founder of the Aus-
tralian section of Medecins Sat/s Frot/heres: "Humanitarian action is more than a 
technical exercise at nourishing or healing a population defined as in need; it is a 
moral endeavor based on solidarity with other members ofhumanity."19 The role 
of the CMAC (and its Secretariat comprised initially of ADF, Singaporean and US 
officers, with representatives of the Australian Government Aid Program 
(AUSAlD), the US Agency for International Development (USAlD) and the UN 
Joint Logistic Centre (UNJLC)) was to manage the prosaic but crucial tasks of set-
ting priorities, allocating scarce air assets and ensuring that relief supplies were effi-
cientlyand effectively distributed. 
In those early weeks of the operation, certain misconceptions about the needs of 
Aceh proved difficult to dispeL It fairly quickly became evident that the survivors 
suffered relatively few serious injuries and that there were sufficient medical staff 
and equipment for their needs. It proved challenging to stem the tide of doctors 
and nurses to the region. The real needs were engineers for reconstruction, envi-
ronmental health officers to counter disease and qualified NGOs to manage the 
camps of displaced persons. 
A considerable amount of aid donated from around the world was undoubtedly 
well intended but misguided. The warehouses in Medan were brimming with 
sweaters, Western-style tinned baby food, hillocks of canned baked beans, crates of 
boiled fruitcake and mounds of precooked meals for which the people of tropical 
Aceh had neither the need nor the appetite. Truckloads of disposable diapers were 
a mystery to these people and contributed yet more waste in a region blanketed in 
litter. The pressing need was, in fact, for dried fish , rice noodles, powdered milk 
and cloth diapers.20 
The best NGOs were informed, organized and relatively self-sufficient. In par-
ticular, the International Organization for Migration (lOM) had vehicles and was 
well organized. The World Food Program (WFP) had aircraft and their own tem-
porary accommodation. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
Medecins Sans Frot/tieres were experienced, politically informed and focused on 
finding solutions, and Caritas efficiently directed its energies to pastoral care. 
The NGOs who experienced the most frustration and were perhaps less effective 
were those who were impractical, ignorant of Shari a law, failed to calibrate security 
concerns into their plans, complained that the Indonesian government did not un-
derstand them and failed to appreciate that a humanitarian disaster must be ad-
dressed in its context. Some NGOs, in their callow enthusiasm, failed to appreciate 
that the consent of any nation to welcome large and diverse numbers of 
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international military and civilian relief workers is rarely unconditional and open-
ended. The most egregious error by a few naive aid workers was to unilaterally set 
offfor Aceh by road through Sumatran jungles only to breakdown and themselves 
become "secondary victims" of the disaster requiring assistance. 
The most effective NGOs were not necessarily the large, established organiza-
tions. A capable group of well-connected volunteers from a Sydney suburban 
council proved effective. Surfers Without Borders diligently hired boats and ac-
cessed the otherwise inaccessible parts of western Sumatra to paddle ashore with 
supplies. And , improbably, Save the Sumatran Orangutans delighted the CMAC 
by arriving with a sumptuous swag of donations to put to good use-for humans. 
The ADF completed its mission in Aceh in three months. "Completed," of 
course, is a relative term. The measure of success in relief operations is a matter of 
delivering the greatest good in the time available. The CMAC worked efficiently, 
certainly diligently, and aid was directed purposefully and quickly. It proved an ef-
fective mechanism, as OCHA describes, for bridging the "humanitarian gap be-
tween the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to sat isfy and the 
resources available to meet them."21 
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